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Abstract 
GVC governance theory explains the management of interfirm relationships in the context of 
offshoring and outsourcing in the latter part of the 20th century. It emphasises the power of 
lead firms to shape the new global supply chains that were developed at this time. 
Parsimonious theorising combined with lead firm power has led to criticisms that the theory 
is determinist and fails to allow for the agency of the non-lead firms that are often referred to 
as suppliers. Critics have argued that more attention needs to be given to supplier agency and 
capability formation in the places where value chains touch down in the global economy. This 
contribution argues that the weaknesses of GVC governance theory lie in its limited conception 
of the capability approach to industrial organisation and its focus on efficient government 
solutions at a given point in time. Introducing a dynamic capability perspective makes it 
possible to understand the circumstances in which suppliers are likely to possess capabilities 
that are valuable to their customers and allows a movement away from a static, equilibrium 
perspective. However, this view of suppliers does not rule out the importance of structural 
constraints on firm opportunities. The role of architectural manipulation in creating power 
asymmetries in GVCs is discussed.  
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1 Introduction 
The characteristics of globalisation changed fundamentally in the latter part of the 20th century and in 
the first decade of the 21st. Manufacturing shifted to developing and emerging economies, as indicated 
by the declining share of the G7 countries in world exports and global manufacturing GDP. In 1991 the 
G7 accounted for 52% of world exports and 65% of global manufacturing GDP. By 2011 the shares had 
declined to 32% and 47% respectively (Baldwin, 2011: 3). At the same time, global manufacturing was 
characterised by the fragmentation of production into discrete parts and increasing trade in 
components (or tasks) rather than final products. Initially, at least, this led to a global division of labour 
in which low-skilled, labour-intensive tasks were shifted to low-wage economies while higher value 
activities remained in high-income countries. (Fröbel et al., 1980; Gourevitch et al., 2000; McKendrick, 
2004). This process has been studied from many angles. Economists have referred to it as production 
fragmentation, vertical specialisation, global production sharing, slicing up the value-added chain, 
trading tasks and supply-chain trade (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001; Feenstra and Hanson, 2001; 
Krugman, 1995; WTO, 2013: 78; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2010; Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015; 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Approaches focusing on the firm, including international 
business, industrial organisation and international development, have referred to offshore outsourcing, 
global production networks, global value chains and the global factory (Doh, 2005; Coe et al., 2004; 
Gereffi et al., 2005; Buckley, 2011).  
 
The theory of global value chain (GVC) governance set out by Gereffi et al. (2005)1 contributed to these 
debates by examining how fragmented activities were being coordinated and focusing on governance 
forms that lay between arm’s-length market relationships and hierarchy (vertical integration). GHS put 
forward a theory that presented three characteristics of transactions (information complexity, degree 
of codification and supplier capabilities) as the determinants of five different inter-firm governance 
types — market, hierarchy, and three intermediate forms (modular, relational and captive governance). 
In common with enterprise-focused analyses of globalisation, GHS stressed the important and strategic 
role of lead firms2 in shaping and driving global value chains and choosing which governance form to 
manage relationships with other firms. In the words of Gibbon and Ponte, these activities include 
“defining the terms of chain membership, incorporating/excluding other actors accordingly and 
allocating to them value-adding activities that lead agents do not wish to perform” (2005: 3).  
 
One consequence of this emphasis on lead firms was to characterise suppliers as largely passive 
respondents to the requirements and opportunities created by the active agency of lead firms. 
Critiques of this view have coalesced around two issues: its explanation of optimal governance choices 
as determined by the three transactional characteristics, and the absence of supplier agency. Gibbon 
et al. argue that GHS emphasises structural constraints (characteristics of industries or processes) 
“rather than the intentional strategic actions of firms” (2008: 323). Sako and Zylberberg (2017: 6) 
conclude that the three governance determinants create a theory that is deterministic and 
functionalist — the transactional characteristics determine the most efficient governance outcome for 
any transaction and that powerful lead firms possess the ability to choose and apply this outcome. In 
addition to this, it is frequently argued that the theory’s focus on transactional characteristics and 
vertical linkages in value chains fails to understand that chains are embedded in broader relationships 
and in specific localities that expand the choices available to suppliers (Coe et al., 2008: 274-75; 
Henderson et al., 2002: 444-45).  
 
This Discussion Paper argues that the underlying problem is neither the issue of supplier agency, nor 
one of determinist and functionalist explanations. However, the treatment of suppliers in GHS and in 
                                                          
1 Hereinafter referred to as GHS. 
2 Other theories in this group have used similar names for the same type of role: focal firm (Coe et al., 2004; 
Buckley, 2009), flagship firm (Rugman and D'Cruz, 1997), hub firm (Jarillo, 1988) and lead firm (Coe et al., 2008). 
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GVC theorising more generally is certainly problematic. More recognition is required of the variety of 
roles played by suppliers in value chains. The root cause of GVC theory’s difficulties on this issue lies in 
its tendency to confine the governance challenge to one of static efficiency, or “What is the best way 
to manage an outsourcing relationship at any given point in time?”, rather than one of dynamic 
efficiency , which is about adapting to changing market and competitive environments in order to 
sustain the competitiveness of a linked set of businesses over time. This can be achieved by deepening 
the analysis of capabilities by introducing dynamic capabilities and considering the factors that 
influence the distribution of capabilities along value chains. 
 
Section 2 provides an account of the GVC approach, drawing on GHS. It examines the empirical context 
in which the theory was developed and the different literatures it drew on to explain its approach to 
suppliers. This is followed by a more detailed examination of the critiques made of it in relation to its 
treatment of suppliers. A more detailed discussion of the issues of determinism and functionalism is 
provided in Appendix 1. Section 3 then introduces the literature on dynamic capabilities and uses this 
to provide an account of the circumstances under which suppliers play a more active role in sustaining 
the competitiveness of the chain as a whole by identifying new opportunities or meeting new 
challenges and mobilising the capabilities required to address them. The final part of Section 3 takes 
the discussion of capabilities further by introducing the concept of architectural manipulation in order 
to explore how, even if firms upstream and downstream in global value chains are able to exercise 
agency and make strategic decisions about capability, they may still find their options limited by  
asymmetries in power. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2 Globalisation and global value chains 
Global chains of linked activities are not a product of the late 20th-century. Researchers working in the 
framework of commodity chains and world systems theory have identified chains of linked activities 
spanning national boundaries in many sectors even prior to the development of industrial capitalism. 
Examples include the shipbuilding and grain flour commodity chains (Özveren, 1994; Pelizzon, 1994). 
The distinctive features of late 20th-century globalisation were the fragmentation of production 
processes and the switch from trade in products to trade in tasks.  
 
Peter Dicken’s influential work on globalisation contrasted pre-1914 internationalisation based on 
arm’s-length trade in goods with late 20th-century globalisation, which involved “not merely the 
geographical extension of economic activity across national boundaries but also — and more 
importantly — the functional integration of such internationally dispersed activities. They reflect, 
therefore, essentially qualitative changes in the way economic activities are organized” (Dicken, 2003: 
12, stress in original). 
 
One way of achieving functional integration was to create subsidiaries and retain offshore activities 
within the enterprise. Dicken asserted that “deep integration, organized primarily within the 
production networks of transnational corporations (TNCs), is becoming increasingly pervasive” (2003: 
12). In 1961 the US electronics company, Fairchild Semiconductor, relocated labour-intensive assembly 
of transistors from the United States to a subsidiary operation in Hong Kong. Components were 
shipped to Hong Kong, assembled and then returned to the USA. The type of trade is called vertical 
specialisation, which Yi defines as “the increasing interconnectedness of production processes in a 
sequential, vertical trading chain stretching across many countries, with each country specializing in 
particular stages of a good’s production sequence” (Yi, 2003: 53). In the garment sector, Fröbel et al. 
(1980) analysed offshoring by German textile and garment companies to Eastern Europe and Asia and 
the resulting job losses and factory closures in Germany. However, while they documented many cases 
of overseas subsidiaries being created, they also noted that offshore facilities included “production 
abroad by quite a significant number of nominally independent foreign producers, in particular 
through subcontracting and export-processing cooperation agreements with Eastern European and 
 4  
 
East Asian firms” (Fröbel et al., 1980: 17). In other words, globalisation could involve outsourcing 
alongside offshoring.  
 
In both cases, however, offshoring was seen as the relocation of low-wage and low-skilled activities. 
The shift of hard disk drive (HDD) assembly activities from the United States to Southeast Asia provides 
a clear example. In 1995 US firms accounted for 88.4% of global hard disk production (by units, not 
value), but almost all (95%) of their labour-intensive final assembly operations had been shifted 
outside of the United States, with Southeast Asia accounting for 64.2% of global HDD final assembly in 
that year (Gourevitch et al., 1997). Higher-paid tasks remained in the United States, and US workers 
accounted for a disproportionate share of these firms’ wage bills: 28.5% of their global workforce 
remained in the United States, but these employees accounted for 62.4% of their overall wage bill 
(Gourevitch et al., 2000: 308).3  
 
This is the context within which global value chain governance theory was developed — offshoring and 
outsourcing, the transfer predominantly of low-skilled fragments of overall production processes, and 
continuing integration of fragmented activities with or without direct ownership by the lead firm. The 
following section discusses how this context shaped the theory’s account of suppliers and their role 
and agency in GVCs. 
 
2.1 Globalisation, fragmentation and integration  
The idea of a chain of linked activities figures prominently in the work of Hopkins and Wallerstein 
(1977). They were concerned with the creation of the capitalist world economy, which they date to 
the 16th century, and the global-scale divisions of labour within it that created and reproduced 
inequalities between core and periphery regions. Commodity chains tie the world production system 
together and are central to the constitution of structural inequalities within it. They defined a 
commodity chain in the following terms:  
 
“What we mean by such [commodity] chains is the following: take an ultimate consumable 
item and trace back the set of inputs that culminated in this item — the prior transformations, 
the raw materials, the transportation mechanisms, the labor input into each of the material 
processes, the food inputs into the labor. This linked set of processes we call a commodity 
chain.” (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1977: 128)  
 
This macro and long-term perspective on capitalist development was subsequently re-developed by 
Gereffi and Korzeniewicz into the “global commodity chain” concept, which analysed transnational 
divisions of labour and interfirm relations in late 20th-century globalisation from the perspective of 
chains of linked activities (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1990; 1994).4 Gereffi refers to an input output 
structure as “a set of products and services linked together in a sequence of value-adding economic 
activities” (1994: 97). The critical point for Gereffi, however, was how the activities along such chains 
were to be coordinated — the governance question.  
 
The basic governance choice facing an offshoring company is whether to create subsidiaries or contract 
with independent suppliers. This is the choice between “make-in” (vertical integration within the same 
company) and “buy out” (using the market). The option chosen is often explained by reference to the 
complexity of the tasks to be offshored and the risks involved. As Buckley (2009: 135) notes, “Products 
with standard manufacturing interfaces and services with standard processes are ideal for outsourcing. 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that trade policies such as the US 807 initiative and the EU’s Outward Processing Trade 
played an important role in promoting these new divisions of labour.  
4  For a further discussion of the transition from world systems theory to global commodity chains and 
subsequently to global value chains, see Bair (2005; 2009).  
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A lack of interaction of the offshore facility with other functions enables a clean interface to be created 
and a ‘fine-slicing’ cut to be made.” Where outsourcing would give rise to problems with intellectual 
property rights protection or the need for complex information exchanges, it is better to use a 
subsidiary.  
 
One distinctive contribution of the global commodity chain approach (Gereffi, 1994) and, subsequently, 
GVC theory to this discussion lies in their treatment of the space between market and hierarchy: (i) 
this intermediate space is extensive and growing, 5  and it plays a substantial role in interfirm 
relationships in the global economy; (ii) three distinct governance forms lie in the space between 
market and hierarchy; and, (iii) a simple, parsimonious framework can explain the occurrence of these 
different governance forms. The theory of GVC governance used three variables relating to the 
characteristics of transactions manufacturing networks and supplier competence — the complexity of 
information required to support the transaction (complexity), the extent to which the information 
required for the transaction was codified (codification) and the level of supplier competence in relation 
to that required to meet the requirements of the transaction. These three determinants created five 
types of governance: market, hierarchy and the three intermediate forms, modular, relational, and 
captive governance.6 
 
Notwithstanding the observation of Buckley above, empirical studies of GVCs in the 1990s and early 
2000s revealed complex relationships between firms without equity ties: 
 
• Fragmentation requires coordination and this increases the complexity of even apparently 
“simple” outsourcing. Even if direct production work might use widely available skills, the 
complementary functions required from the supplier (such as ensuring product quality and 
safety, consistency of production, reliability of delivery, and the ability to respond to 
unanticipated circumstances) involve more complexity and more coordination.  
• Retailers and brand companies often require products customised to their particular needs. 
This may extend to specifications about material and component inputs, manufacturing 
processes, delivery schedules, product mix, quality, and quality control. This requires more 
information transfer and more coordination of activities.  
• Such requirements are further raised by the introduction of new management practices. For 
example, the use of low inventory models and the shift of inventory holding from customers 
to supplier (Gibbon, 2002) make systems more fragile and harder for suppliers to manage, 
while raising the cost to buyers of supplier performance failures. 
• Gereffi’s work on buyer-driven chains highlighted the role of non-manufacturing businesses — 
brand owners, retailers, etc. — in creating new global. The growth of “manufacturers without 
factories” (Gereffi, 1999: 46) increased the range of activities performed by suppliers. The 
outsourcing of production by upmarket design and branding businesses required close 
collaboration on the introduction of new designs and the transformation of these designs into 
final products that met the consumers requirements for quality, cost and delivery. As a result, 
the commissioning firms would remain “heavily involved in activities relating to the production 
of goods….FGPFs [factoryless goods producing firms] are manufacturing-like as they perform 
many of the tasks and activities found in manufacturing firms” (Bernard and Fort, 2015: 518).  
• The need for such involvement and has increased as consumer and NGO concern about issues 
such as environmental impact and working conditions have pushed lead firms to take more 
responsibility for the environmental and social impacts of their value chains. 
 
                                                          
5 Hennart (1993) refers to this is the "swollen middle". 
6 GHS argues that any transaction requiring non-complex exchanges of information will be managed through 
arm's-length market relationships. There are then four governance type responding to the possible permutations 
of codification and supplier competence. 
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Coordination is expensive, and businesses try to reduce the need for it. However, as more empirical 
work was carried out on a variety of different global value chains, the novel finding for many 
researchers was the extent to which lead firms intervened in the activities of the firms that supplied 
them.  
 
Many researchers were aware that such linkages were not the whole story, but it certainly constituted 
a novel and important finding, and one that appeared to have been marginalised previously. The way 
this informed the analysis of developing country suppliers is shown by the example of Schmitz’s work 
on a shoe industry cluster in southern Brazil. This had originally been framed by the literature on Italian 
and German industrial districts (Schmitz, 1989; Schmitz, 1992) that led to an interest in collective 
efficiency and the role of institutions and inter-firm interactions in making clusters globally competitive. 
However, Schmitz’s long term, in-depth empirical research on the Sinos Valley shoe cluster in Brazil 
showed that the major footwear exporters were mostly working for global brand companies that were 
involved in design, branding and retail, but not manufacturing (Schmitz, 1995). The Brazilian firms used 
their customers’ designs and sometimes relied on these customers for raw materials sourcing and 
outbound logistics. This division of labour was more typical of a fragmented global value chain than an 
Italian industrial district. In a subsequent paper on clusters and value chains, Humphrey and Schmitz 
recognised elements of the industrial district model that remain relevant —firm-level investments and 
strategic intent were important for capability acquisition even in the Sinos Valley (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002: 1025) — but they chose to emphasise the importance of this cluster’s global linkages:7 
 
“The recognition of the importance of clustering has put economic geography back at the 
centre of the economic development debate in both developed and less developed countries. 
However, the preoccupation with the quality of local linkages has led to a neglect of the global 
linkages. The global value chain approach emphasizes that, in many cases, the clustering 
producers do not sell into open markets and that the chains connecting the local producers 
with the distant retailers are subject to governance by powerful lead firms.” (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002: 1025) 
 
Taken together, the characteristics of globalisation outlined so far created a particular view of the 
position of suppliers in GVCs at the end of the 20th century. First, the incorporation of new production 
locations into the global economy created the potential for mismatches between the requirements of 
global buyers and the experience and capabilities of local suppliers (Keesing and Lall, 1992). So-called 
“latecomer firms” that entered the global economy and switched from domestic markets to global 
markets might face knowledge gaps with respect to both the requirements of external markets and 
the technologies and capabilities required to meet them. Hobday refers to these as "competitive 
disadvantages" (1995: 1172), while Schmitz terms them marketing and technology gaps (2007: 420-
21). The implication is that such suppliers might struggle to acquire the capabilities needed to meet 
the demands of their new global customers. These considerations account for the emphasis in GHS on 
supplier capabilities. 
 
Second, the dominant view of fragmentation and the new division of labour within the global economy 
was that limited, often low-skilled tasks were offshored to subsidiaries or outsourced to suppliers in 
developing and emerging markets. This meant that opportunities for these suppliers to add value 
would be limited. Furthermore, it meant that such suppliers would mostly be confined to activities for 
which barriers to entry were low (although it was suggested above that the complexity of managing 
even simple production tasks has been underestimated). Low barriers to entry for suppliers combined 
with lead firms that are able to make strategic choices and possessed key resources create substantial 
asymmetries in power between lead firms and suppliers.  
                                                          
7 Similarly, Giuliani et al. (2005: 551) placed Latin American clusters in the context of GVCs, arguing that “more 
attention needs to be paid to external linkages.” 
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Third, GVC theory, in common with other characterisations of the role the powerful firms in the global 
economy (see note 2 above), saw this power as allowing lead firms to shape value chains in accordance 
with their strategic goals. For GVC theorists, lead firms shape value chains by performing some or all 
of the following tasks: defining product characteristics and production processes, choosing where to 
produce, distributing tasks along the chain, influencing the distribution of risks and rewards along the 
chain, and deciding on the inclusion and exclusion of suppliers and forms of performance monitoring 
(see, for example, Bair and Palpacuer, 2015: s4; Dolan et al., 1999: 18-21; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005: 3). 
Lead firms are able to do this even in the absence of equity ties (Bair, 2005: 159).  
 
Fourth, in addition to constraining the options available to suppliers at any given point in time, GVC 
theory often attributes changes in supplier capabilities and activities to decisions made by lead firms. 
Analyses of upgrading and capability acquisition by suppliers have frequently been framed in terms of 
the opportunities created or allowed by the lead firms. Bair and Gereffi argue that when Mexican 
garment suppliers made a transition from maquiladora to full package production, they did so partly 
as a result of NAFTA, but also because of changes in the nature of lead firms: “The contrast between 
manufacturers and other big buyers (retailers and marketers) in their capabilities and needs gives rise 
to the difference between assembly and full-package networks” (Bair and Gereffi, 2001: 1892). In a 
different context, Sturgeon and Kawakami account for the change in the activities performed by 
suppliers in the Taiwanese electronics industry by reference to local firms being “asked and in some 
cases forced by de-verticalised ‘manufacturers’ in the West — to move up the value chain…and take 
full responsibility for component sourcing, final assembly, and the organisation of multi-country value 
chains in East Asia” (Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2011: 129). 
 
2.2 Shortcomings of the GVC approach to suppliers 
Critiques of the approach set out in GHS fall into two categories. The first is the charge that GVC theory 
is “incomplete” because it ignores many other factors that affect how firms interact. The second is that 
it ignores supplier agency and supplier strategy. The first critique is often advanced by researchers 
using the Global Production Networks (GPN) approach.8 It is argued that the “three determinants” 
approach in GHS provides an incomplete account of governance because many other factors 
contribute to the functioning and evolution of GVCs. The key arguments are: 
 
• Non-chain actors such as states, labour unions and NGOs have an impact on how chains 
function (Horner, 2017: 209; Coe et al., 2004). For example, multi-stakeholder sustainability 
initiatives involving standards and certification alter GVC governance dynamics. An 
understanding of how GVCs operate should take such actors and initiatives into account. The 
GHS model can explain how standards and certification impact on the three governance 
determinants — for example, standards increase codification (replacing inspection of supplier 
facilities with audit and monitoring by a certification body) and raise supplier capability 
requirements in areas such as process management and documentation — but it provides no 
explanation of when and how pressures arise to adopt standards arise. 
• GVCs “touch down” in specific places. Local institutions and local initiatives impact on the 
ability of suppliers to acquire new capabilities or seek out new markets. Therefore, it follows 
that even with the same lead firms, levels of information complexity and degree of codification, 
different outcomes might arise according to where GVCs touch down: “In reality, each stage 
of a production chain is embedded in much wider sets of non-linear/horizontal relationships” 
(Coe et al., 2008: 274-75). Where suppliers are competent, more complex tasks might be 
                                                          
8 The GVC and GPN approaches are closely related, with overlaps in personnel and collaborations on research. 
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outsourced.9 Equally, the agglomeration of many firms in the same sector and the presence of 
local institutions should reduce the costs of searching for new customers. These factors create 
a degree of heterogeneity which, it is argued, is not reflected in the broad generalisations 
about sectors and value chain structure provided in much of GVC theorising. 
• The “touching down” argument then leads to a broader critique of the chain concept itself, 
with GPN scholars contrasting it with the concept of network which, it is frequently suggested, 
allows for greater complexity and is inherently non-deterministic (Henderson et al., 2002: 444-
45). This has consequences for how supplier capabilities evolve: “In contrast to the linear and 
rather deterministic upgrading paths typical of some GVC approaches (e.g. Gereffi et al., 2005), 
[GPN 2.0] instead foregrounds the many different value capture trajectories that can result 
when a firm in a particular locality connects into a global production network” (Coe and Yeung, 
2019: 780, stress in original). 
 
The second critique, supplier agency, focuses on the issue of individual firms, strategy and agency, 
linking these questions to both the acquisition of technological capabilities and choice of customers. 
Morrison et al. discuss supplier capability acquisition in terms of cluster effects, purposeful 
investments by firms and their absorptive capability: 
 
“For [local producers], technological efforts and absorption capabilities are also crucial, and 
the GVC literature often underplays them and, with a high dose of determinism, suggests that 
knowledge transfers and upgrading are influenced mainly by the institutional settings, with 
GVC structures and chain leaders’ strategies setting the pace and direction of knowledge flows 
and upgrading (either in favour or against the interests of local producers).” (Morrison et al., 
2008: 47) 
 
A similar critique is advanced by De Marchi et al. (2015), who consider the transfer of technological 
knowledge in the context not only of inter-firm linkages within GVCs but also within domestic 
technological capabilities and local innovation systems. This comprehensive study concludes that “GVC 
studies tend to overlook the wide heterogeneity existing at the local level, as local suppliers in 
developing countries are very different in terms of their capacity to absorb, master, and change 
knowledge and capabilities that lead firms in GVCs can potentially transfer to them” (De Marchi et al., 
2015: 33). 
 
A related critique by Sako and Zylberberg (2017)10  points out that while GVC governance theory 
recognises the active and extensive agency of lead firms i GVCs supplier agency is almost completely 
absent. They criticise GVC theory for not recognising that “suppliers exercise discretion not only over 
which capabilities to internalize, but also which client(s) to work for. These strategic decisions on the 
part of suppliers are seen to influence how inter-firm relationships are governed” (Sako and Zylberberg, 
2017: 2-3). If suppliers do become able to provide inputs and services of greater value to customers, 
barriers to entry increase and supplier power rises. As a result, governance relationships and power 
asymmetries become more favourable to supplier agency and value capture.  
 
The argument is that GHS and the subsequent GVC literature overemphasizes the importance of 
buyers and ignores the agency of suppliers and other actors in the places they touch down. Although 
detailed case studies (for example, of suppliers in East Asia in a volume edited by Kawakami and 
                                                          
9 In the case of Kenyan fresh vegetable exporters, for example, the research of Dolan and Humphrey (2000; 2004) 
found that exporters were able to offer UK importers and supermarkets ideas for new product development, but 
the overall message of the research was framed in terms of buyer control of day-to-day activities and 
performance. 
10 Sako and Zylberberg examine the issues of supplier agency and value capture. The discussion here focuses on 
supplier agency only. 
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Sturgeon (2011)) emphasize how the development of firm capabilities is determined not only by the 
outsourcing strategies of lead firms, but also by the learning strategies of latecomer firms (Kawakami, 
2011b: 5-6), this has not been central to much GVC work. 
 
The critiques just outlined have important implications for GVC theory. The determinist critique is that 
the three variables put forward in GHS are truly exogenous determinants that arise from the 
characteristics of transactions (as is the case, for example, with the category of asset specificity in 
transaction cost economics), which leaves lead firms with a single, optimal governance choice. In 
addition, the functionalist critique is that GHS expects lead firms to be constrained to adopt the one 
optimal solution because failure to adopt it would lead to a loss of competitiveness. Hence, there is a 
direct link between transactional characteristics and governance outcomes that eliminates both 
agency and diversity. An alternative interpretation of GVC governance theory and the arguments put 
forward in GHS is provided in Appendix 1. This discusses an alternative conception of the meaning of 
“chain”, presents a different view about whether the three variables are exogenous determinants of 
governance choices, argues that the theory need not be interpreted as functionalist, and discusses the 
concept of lead firm.  
 
2.3 From static to dynamic buyer-supplier relations 
The world of suppliers and their relationships with customers, even in developing and emerging 
economies, is markedly more complex now than it was even 20 years ago. Global mega suppliers have 
emerged in both industrialised and emerging markets (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004), and increasing 
concentration among global retailers has driven concentration among suppliers and the emergence of 
“giant transnational contractors” (Appelbaum, 2008: 71). These new trends go alongside a greater 
appreciation of the role of suppliers as innovation leaders by authors such as Hsieh (2015). The need 
to refine an understanding of lead firms and their suppliers acquires even greater urgency because of 
the development of technology and market platforms that appear to radically alter interfirm 
relationships (Van Alstyne et al., 2016). 
 
Addressing these issues requires a rethinking of the theory of governance advanced in GHS that goes 
beyond considerations of supplier agency and the places where GVCs touch down in the global 
economy. Two changes in particular are required. The first is to move away from a static, contractual 
approach to the issues of establishing firm boundaries and managing external relations (as discussed 
by Rathe and Witt, 2001). The key question is not “At any given point in time, what is the most efficient 
way to define the boundaries of the firm manage relationship’s with suppliers?”, but rather “What are 
the governance implications of the need to manage technical change along chains in the context of 
competitive challenges, and what determines the location of innovative activities along chains?” The 
second is to incorporate a more sophisticated discussion of capabilities into the GVC governance 
framework. This requires a discussion of dynamic capabilities.11 
 
A step in this rethinking is set out in the following section. It discusses the capability approach — 
particularly dynamic capabilities. This is followed by an analysis of the factors that determine where 
innovation is situated in GVCs. Finally, it examines how the options available for businesses to acquire 
capabilities are constrained by architectural manipulation (Jacobides et al., 2006). This allows a 
recognition of increasing agency and heterogeneity in GVCs while at the same time recognising that 
industry structures place constraints on what is feasible at any given time, or with any given level of 
resources. 
                                                          
11 It should be noted that almost half of the analysis in GHS is devoted to a section entitled "dynamic value chain 
analysis: sectoral cases". The four case studies describe examples of supplier innovation, supplier learning and 
the co-evolution of suppliers and buyers, but these insights are weakly reflected in the article's theoretical 
framework. 
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3 Suppliers and capabilities: a dynamic approach  
The theoretical underpinnings for GHS were drawn from a range of sources that were deployed 
unevenly across the governance categories. Transaction costs economics and knowledge-based 
theories of the enterprise figure prominently in the explanations of captive and modular governance. 
These are linked, as much of the discussion of transaction costs in GHS focuses on the “mundane 
transaction costs” (Bair, 2005: 163) that arise from information transfer, rather than the costs involved 
in controlling opportunism. Drawing on the prior work of Sturgeon (2002), the modular governance 
category focuses on the role of product modularity in codifying knowledge and enabling firm 
boundaries to be drawn at “thin crossing points”.12 Product modularity has the following impact on 
governance: 
 
“In essence, the standardized component interfaces in a modular product architecture provide 
a form of embedded coordination that greatly reduces the need for overt exercise of 
managerial authority to achieve coordination of development processes, thereby making 
possible the concurrent and autonomous development of components by loosely coupled 
organization structures….using technological knowledge to create modularity in product 
designs becomes an important strategy for achieving modularity in organization designs.” 
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996: 64, stress in original) 
 
This insight into the role of modularity in interfirm relationships could have been used to explore the 
issue of distributed design, but in GHS the main focus was on how modularity reduces the costs of 
coordination at any one point in time. This follows the efficiency maximisation approach used by both 
transaction costs economics and knowledge-based theories. Williamson takes transactional 
characteristics (uncertainty, frequency of exchange and transaction-specific assets) and argues that 
“The efficient organization of economic activity entails matching governance structures with these 
transactional attributes” (Williamson, 1979: 261). The knowledge-based approach adopts a similar 
logic: “The knowledge-based view suggests that firms organize to maximize the ease of 
communication—the transfer of knowledge—between the units involved in the product design 
process. These literatures also suggest strategies for achieving these goals and the resulting 
implications for the modularity of the firm’s organization.” (Hoetker, 2006: 502). 
 
Alongside these theories, GHS also introduces the capability approach, which initially cites Penrose to 
explain why firms might outsource complicated tasks (Gereffi et al., 2005: 81). Capabilities figure 
prominently in the explanation of relational governance, which introduces the ideas of complementary 
capabilities and tacit knowledge, drawn from the analysis of Palpacuer (2000). However, the capability 
discussion in GHS and in GVC analysis more generally should be considered as a lost opportunity. First, 
relational governance is by far the least discussed category of governance in the subsequent GVC 
literature. Captive governance and its implications for economic growth, incomes and livelihoods in 
developing and emerging markets was of much more interest to many GVC researchers.13 Second, the 
treatment of capabilities in GHS is limited. The term is used predominantly in the sense of an ability to 
perform some activity, without references to the deployment of tacit knowledge and skills that are 
hard to develop. These elements are central to the capability approach. Third, while the case studies 
                                                          
12 This argument drew on the work of Baldwin and Clark (2000), whose arguments concerning standards and 
firm boundaries were developed further in a subsequent article by Baldwin (2008). 
13 There are some exceptions to the neglect of capabilities and the implications of the capability approach within 
the GVC literature. Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) discuss capabilities in relation to upgrading and value capture. 
Palpacuer (2000) analyses firms’ organisational strategies in relation to the distribution of competences along 
chains or networks. This draws substantially on the management literature on core, complementary and 
standard competencies.  
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of value chain dynamics in the second half of GHS refer to increasing supplier competence, there is 
little discussion of how suppliers might acquire new capabilities or what determines the location of 
particular capabilities along and value chain. More in-depth discussion of the capability approach and 
its implications for the analysis of suppliers is required. 
 
3.1 Static and dynamic capabilities 
All theories of economic organisation are concerned with imperfect knowledge and uncertainty about 
the future. Langlois and Foss identify two categories of imperfect knowledge that are relevant to 
economic organisation: knowledge about how to produce and knowledge about how link one firm’s 
production knowledge with another’s (1999: 203). The first is about capabilities, and the second about 
qualitative coordination. GVC theory is stronger on the latter, but under-developed on the former. A 
third category of imperfection can be added to this list – imperfect information about markets. Sabel’s 
concept of self-discovery (Sabel, 2012) emphasises the time and space-specific efforts required to 
identify market opportunities and devise ways of deploying resources to meet them. These 
imperfections and their uneven distribution across firms and locations provide a link to the technology 
and marketing gaps literature mentioned above. 
 
The capability approach to industrial organisation views productive knowledge as the key to enterprise 
competitiveness. Within the literature on industrial organisation, capability has been defined as “the 
firm-specific and time- and space-contingent ability to perform a particular productive activity” 
(Jacobides and Winter, 2012: 365). The incremental and tacit accumulation of knowledge within the 
enterprise is the source of its specific competitive advantages:  
 
“productive activities are not best understood as a matter of applying commonly accessible 
explicit knowledge ('blueprints') in the instantaneous and profit-maximizing combination of 
factors of production. Rather, such activities involve processes of accumulation of partly tacit 
knowledge through various largely incremental learning-processes (learning by doing, by using, 
and by searching). This tends to make the firm's course of development path-dependent. It is 
ultimately these properties that make firms differ.” (Foss, 1996: 17-18) 
 
Capabilities are not acquired easily and cannot be transferred easily between firms. They arise in 
specific times and places (hence the importance of locality, local institutions, local business 
interactions and markets, and state institutions and support), and their uneven and differentiated 
distribution creates firm heterogeneity.  
 
Two elements of the capability literature offer insights into how to think about suppliers in the GVC 
context. The first is the focus on capabilities that give firms a competitive advantage. For 
competitiveness and value capture, the ability to generate and manage valuable, rare, inimitable and 
non-substitutable (VRIN) resources are what matters (Pitelis, 2009: 1120; Madhok et al., 2010: 98). 
These enable businesses to obtain rents at any given point in time (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009: 29-
30). However, such resources will always be subject to challenges from competitors and changes in 
the external environment. This leads to the distinction between ordinary and dynamic capabilities, as 
discussed by Teece (1997). Ordinary capabilities are those required to perform a set of activities 
correctly: “Ordinary capabilities can best be thought of as achieving technical efficiency and ‘doing 
things right’ in basic business functions: operations, administration, and governance” (Teece, 2015: 
18). This characterisation corresponds to the static efficiency perspective in GVC theory — the best 
way to manage an outsourcing relationship at any given point in time.  
 
Dynamic capabilities enable businesses to continually renew their resources and to sustain their 
competitive advantage: “The dynamic capability perspective focuses on the capacity an organization 
facing a rapidly changing environment has to create new resources, to renew or alter its resource mix” 
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(Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009: 29-30). They allow businesses “to continuously create, extend, 
upgrade, protect, and keep relevant the enterprise’s unique asset base” (Teece, 2007: 1319). These 
include the ability to identify new opportunities and new ways of meeting market challenges, as well 
as the ability to mobilise the organisation and its resources to meet these opportunities. 
 
Teece focuses on the enterprise and its resources. The introduction of a GVC perspective reframes this 
issue to put dynamic capabilities in the context of buyer-supplier relationships. It is now common to 
talk about competition between supply chains or ecosystems (Hein et al., 2020; Jacobides, 2019), and 
the discovery of new market opportunities and new ways of satisfying them might require 
simultaneous and coordinated action from multiple businesses along the value chain.14 This defines 
the key governance challenge as one of generating and managing change. The challenges of achieving 
such coordination may result in vertical integration. This is the finding of work on the hard disk drive 
sector: where periodic changes in substrate materials to increase storage capacity require changes in 
read-write mechanisms and uncertainties about interactions between the modules of the newly-
designed product (Chesbrough, 2003: 182-84). However, Dibiaggio warns against generalising from 
such findings and concludes that “although designing the architecture of the system requires 
knowledge integration, this process need not necessarily be managed by a single entity but can be 
undertaken by a set of cooperating partners” (Dibiaggio, 2007: 246). In some cases, vertical integration 
may not be an option as firms outsourcing activities may have the expertise and tacit knowledge 
required to perform them.  
 
At the level of the chain, dynamic capabilities are best characterised as the ability of suppliers and 
customers to respond to changes in the technological and competitive environment in coordinated 
ways that secure the value of their resources. This could involve suppliers innovating to meet new 
customer requirements, or suppliers anticipating or identifying new market opportunities 
independently or jointly with customers. A focus on dynamic capabilities puts innovation at the centre 
of GVC governance questions and responds to Langlois’ observation that the ability to generate 
technological progress is the central question for the analysis of network and hierarchical forms of 
industrial organisation (Langlois, 1998: 1-2). GVC governance theory has not provided an adequate 
understanding of the role of suppliers in this process.  
 
The importance of dynamic capabilities in value chains is not limited to cases where businesses are 
operating at the technology frontier. A dynamic chain capability is one which enables a business to 
adapt to a changing environment, both internally and in conjunction with other chain actors. This could 
mean making incremental changes that improve performance or modification of inputs and products 
in response to the differentiated and changing needs of different markets (Bell and Pavitt, 1993: 162). 
This idea follows Hobday’s argument on technological capabilities in latecomer firms, which makes a 
distinction between innovations that are “new to the firm, rather than to the world marketplace” 
(Hobday, 1995: 1190). Such innovations still require efforts to adapt knowledge and equipment to local 
conditions and existing capabilities. Equally, finding new opportunities and then finding, adapting and 
deploying the knowledge and equipment necessary to take advantage of them can be a challenging 
and often idiosyncratic process. 
 
The analysis of the Taiwanese bicycle industry by Hsieh (2015) provides a rich account of the ways in 
which suppliers contributed to technical advances that enabled the industry as a whole to move into 
new product designs and greatly increase its exports of high-value complete bicycles and components. 
One of the innovations analysed by Hsieh is the introduction of aluminium frames, and the study shows 
how one specialist frame manufacturer (i.e., a supplier) worked with an international aluminium 
company (Alcoa and one of its subsidiaries) to acquire knowledge about welding and heat treatment, 
and also worked with local aluminium producers to gain access to local supplies of aluminium of a 
                                                          
14 The conditions under which suppliers might initiate such changes are discussed below. 
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grade and quality sufficient for frame manufacturer (Hsieh, 2015: 349-52). The insights to be drawn 
from this analysis are: 
 
• The role of industry specialists such as Alcoa, which was facilitated by the fact that the 
subsidiary which possessed the specialised knowledge about welding aluminium was not 
competing directly against the Taiwanese company with which the specialist knowledge was 
shared.15  
• The need for firm-level problem-solving by suppliers. 
• The importance of knowledge gained in one sector that could be used for problem solving in 
another. In the case of local aluminium suppliers, for example, products ranged from relatively 
simple aluminium windows to complex products for the aerospace industry. This provided a 
broad range of local knowledge that could be tapped by cycle frame manufacturers.  
• The innovation capabilities of suppliers derived in part from learning from customers based in 
multiple industries and then applying this knowledge to related problems faced by other 
customers. The concept of “technological convergence”, developed by Rosenberg (1963), 
analyses the common technological problems and solutions that arise across multiple 
industries.  
• Agency matters — an individual firm set out to solve the problems involved in introducing 
what was for them a new technology. However, the exercise of this agency was only made 
possible by the prior distribution of innovation capabilities across firms in the bicycle industry 
in the locality, as well as technological convergence across the aluminium industry. In other 
words, agency has to be placed in the context of structure, and this is discussed further below. 
• The relationships that drive innovation in the bicycle sector rely on established interfirm 
networks and local governance arrangements that made complex collaborations manageable. 
Locality and history matter. 
 
3.2 Suppliers, innovation and dynamic capabilities 
It is possible to find suppliers in developing and emerging economies that have acquired the capacity 
to develop new products and processes that are valuable to their customers. The challenge is to explain 
the conditions under which suppliers are likely to possess such capabilities and what this implies for 
relationships between suppliers and their customers. There are three questions:  
 
• What are the factors that drive vertical integration and the concentration of innovation in lead 
firms?  
• When does supplier-led innovation and specialisation offer efficiency advantages?  
• If suppliers do possess important capabilities, what are the implications for chain governance? 
 
Langlois (1998) explores the first question by making a distinction between autonomous and systemic 
innovation. Autonomous innovation, which by definition means innovations that can be contained 
within modules, should allow for vertical disintegration without any cost penalties. As long as changes 
are kept within the design boundaries set by the overall product architecture and its design rules there 
is no need for extra-module coordination, providing the boundary of the module coincides with the 
boundary of the firm. In contrast, systemic innovation “requires simultaneous change in many 
different stages of production” (Langlois, 1998: 2), and in these circumstances vertical disintegration 
is likely to incur a cost penalty because of the complexity of coordinating such changes across firm 
boundaries. The issue is not simply one of information exchange. Langlois’ work on dynamic 
governance costs points to the “costs of persuading, negotiating, coordinating and teaching outside 
                                                          
15 A line of argument that highlights non-monetised exchanges of knowledge and collaborative innovation is 
provided by Baldwin and von Hippel (2009). 
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suppliers” (Langlois, 1992: 113). The process of innovation itself is also uncertain. Design 
interdependencies create complex problems, solutions of uncertain value (to the chain as a whole and 
to individual firms) and situations in which the firms involved can skimp on solutions and may lack 
incentives to invest (Baldwin, 2008: 170-71). Furthermore, uncertainties about future innovation 
requirements and their implications for firms along the chain make it difficult to contract for in advance.  
 
As was noted above, however, systemic innovation does not automatically lead to vertical integration. 
The cost element has to be balanced against benefits. The standard benefits of outsourcing and vertical 
disintegration from a transaction cost perspective are economies of scale and risk pooling (Williamson, 
1979: 245). These are the static costs to be found in equilibrium. Dynamically, Langlois points to the 
ability of outsourcing to draw on a wider range of capabilities. Autonomous innovation and 
specialisation create the “ability of networks to access a larger and more diverse pool of relevant 
capabilities” (Langlois, 1998: 2).16  
 
In addition to this, Rosenberg (1963) provides an argument about supplier specialisation and learning, 
based on the growth of the machine-tool industry in the United States in the 19th century. This saw the 
emergence of specialist equipment suppliers, particularly in the textile and metal cutting sectors. 
Rosenberg argues that in the early part of the century, US manufacturing businesses produced much 
of the machinery they needed to carry out their operations: textile companies produced textile 
machinery, for example. Over time specialist manufacturers emerged. These had the advantage of 
supplying machinery to multiple companies within a given sector, enabling economies of scale and risk 
pooling. In addition, they could use the same machine-building skills to supply businesses in other 
sectors — a process seen particularly clearly for machine-tools used for the cutting and shaping of 
metals. Hence, “A major episode, then, in the process of industrialization lay in the emergence of a 
specialized collection of firms devoted to solving the unique technical problems and mastering the 
specialized skills and knowledge requisite to machine production” (Rosenberg, 1963: 418). Strong 
learning effects arise from this cross-industry convergence of technologies, and this promotes the 
spread of innovations across a range of industries. Rosenberg suggests that this was typical of  various 
US industries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, including railroads, sewing machines, bicycles 
and vehicles (1963: 419-20).  
 
These types of supplier-user relationships can involve a variety of different governance arrangements. 
First, in the case of specialised machinery and technologies that are widely used across industries, the 
incorporation of the technology into machinery or materials can often be managed by arm’s-length 
market relations. A single footwear machinery supplier might supply standardised machines and inputs 
to a large number of footwear manufacturers with little or no customisation to specific needs. A 
supplier of specialist fabrics might do the same. Platforms may also take this route. Platform suppliers 
can package core components in standardised forms that can be integrated into final products by 
customers that have limited technical skills. This is the argument advanced by Watanabe (2014) in a 
collection of articles on the role of core technology suppliers in facilitating final goods production by 
Chinese firms across a broad range of industries. In the case of mobile phones, for example, the core 
chipset may be sold as a standardised package that many downstream users can use, with their 
customisation and innovation confined to peripheral items, as seen in the use of such core chipsets by 
small handset manufacturers in China (Ding and Pan, 2014). Second, the development of industry-wide 
standards can be a route to managing change across multiple enterprises. Such standards can be 
sponsored by particular enterprises, developed by standards-setting organisations and coalitions or 
mandated by regulatory authorities (David and Greenstein, 1990: 4). Third, more complex relational 
governance may be required to manage change in fast-evolving products and industries where the 
benefits arising from innovations that have cross-modular implications become sufficiently strong to 
outweigh the benefits of staying within the limits established by a particular product architecture, even 
                                                          
16 The argument about enlarging the talent pool is particularly relevant for the analysis of platforms. 
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if the former increases coordination and dynamic governance costs. This has been seen clearly in the 
case of mobile businesses in China. As Chinese handset manufacturers moved upmarket and closer to 
the technology frontier, they began to become involved in product innovations that had implications 
that stretched across firm boundaries, including the core chipset manufacturers, camera makers, 
software suppliers and battery and memory management businesses. These required cross-module 
collaborations for design and joint troubleshooting of unexpected problems and interdependencies 
between the different elements of the final product (Humphrey et al., 2018: 414-15; Ding and Hioki, 
2018). Fourth, in the case of suppliers that “provide high performance inputs into complex systems of 
production in the form of machinery, components, instruments and software” (Bell and Pavitt, 1993: 
178-79), there is likely to be a high degree of joint design and problem-solving between supplier and 
customer, which also creates interdependency and complex transfers of tacit information.  
 
It becomes clear that the key factor in these relationships is the relative levels of the capabilities of 
suppliers and customers. The value of the knowledge and capabilities possessed by a supplier has to 
be considered in relation to the knowledge and capabilities of the customer. The relationships between 
the two are changing as a result of globalisation. For example, Marukawa (2009) analyses the role of 
suppliers in providing both advanced components and technical support to assemblers in the Chinese 
motor vehicle industry. These global suppliers with long experience of automotive manufacture are 
able to provide a broad set of problem-solving services to relatively new Chinese automotive 
manufacturers. The established global automotive manufacturers do not require such services. 
Similarly, recent work by Ding (2020) has documented how specialised Japanese small suppliers have 
used the provision of specialist inputs and a range of problem-solving skills and services to their 
Chinese customers as a strategy to overcome their cost disadvantages relative to Chinese competitors. 
In these circumstances, suppliers may have opportunities to provide knowledge and capabilities to 
customers in one market that have been acquired partly through learning from more technological the 
incapable customers in other markets.  
 
This has two implications for the discussion of suppliers and innovation in GVCs. First, the exploration 
of the potential role of suppliers in GVCs is not exhausted by a discussion of the conditions under which 
they might be able to escape the constraints of subordination to lead firms. Second, supplier-customer 
relationships may take very different forms according to the capability levels of each across different 
locations. There is agency and indeterminacy in GVCs, but there are also differences in the structural 
conditions under which suppliers can acquire and market VRIN capabilities, innovate within chains and 
improve their overall performance.  
 
3.3 Industry architecture and architectural manipulation 
The discussion of capability acquisition by suppliers (or firms in general) has to be put in the context of 
structural constraints, and the concepts of industry architecture and architectural manipulation are 
one way of doing this. The industry architecture concept argues that industry sectors have, at any one 
time, a characteristic division of labour between firms:  
 
“The concept of industry architecture (Jacobides et al., 2006) defines the ways in which roles 
are distributed among interacting firms. Industries have fairly well-established rules about 
what activities each party undertakes, as well as roles played by industry players. Industry 
architecture defines both the division of labour between firms and the division of surplus in 
industries, and provide the template for both ‘who does what’ and ‘who gets what’. Industry 
architectures are characterized [by] the distinct ways in which industries follow particular rules 
and how firms’ scope, roles, and relationships, account for the ways in which value gets both 
created and appropriated.” (Tee and Gawer, 2009: 219)  
 
 16  
 
Industry architectures change over time, but in the short term they constrain available choices: firms 
“must choose from a realistic menu of what their transactional partners (with given capabilities) can 
offer” (Jacobides and Winter, 2012: 1370). These architectures do not arise simply from product or 
technology characteristics. They are shaped by the purposive action of firms that seek to strengthen 
their own position (creating entry barriers), weaken their direct competitors, and increase the 
availability of outsourcing options (by facilitating entry). This process is called “architectural 
manipulation”. A platform owner will seek an architecture that is particularly useful for preserving its 
platform leadership and increasing value capture, but the outcome is not necessarily “efficient” at the 
level of the industry as a whole.  
 
The continuing power of lead firms and the resources that they have to change architectures is shown 
in the case of the auto industry by Jacobides et al. (2016). Certain structural characteristics of the auto 
industry — vertical integration, capital intensity and economies of scale, the use of proprietary (closed) 
standards, and the role of OEMs (assemblers) as system integrators with massive scale — restrict the 
entry of new competitors. They go on to show how, at a given point in time, lead firms in the industry 
adopted a policy of outsourcing that gave greater opportunities for suppliers to design substantial 
parts of passenger vehicles. Subsequently, when they (the OEMs) realised that this could allow 
substantially greater value capture by suppliers, they were able to reverse this policy. As a result, “To 
this day, OEMs do most R&D, develop product architecture, design specific models, and set (mostly 
proprietary) specifications for components” (Jacobides et al., 2016: 1948).  
 
Architectural manipulation is also central to the development and preservation of platform leadership. 
Barriers to entry are created in the segments occupied by lead firms and entry to complementary 
activities facilitated.17 Platform leaders attempt to protect their position against rival platforms by 
creating “imitation barriers”, often through increasing technological complexity and the use of 
proprietary technologies (Banalieva and Dhanaraj, 2019: 6), so that the platform becomes a point of 
concentration, or bottleneck. At the same time, they reduce the costs of entry into the complementor 
market by promoting standards and by providing “boundary resources” such as supplier development 
kits (SDKs), application programming interfaces (APIs), 18  roadmaps to provide information about 
future developments and free or low-cost licensing of some intellectual property (Ghazawneh and 
Henfridsson, 2010; 2013). They facilitate entry for complementors (for example, producers of apps for 
mobile phones) while maintaining control over the platform needed for these complements to 
function. For a time, this may secure the position of the platform leader, particularly when network 
effects create monopoly or oligopoly providers, but it is always open to challenge, particularly when 
established practices are disrupted by technological change. The current disruption of the motor 
vehicle industry created by the transition to electric vehicles provides an example of a long-standing 
industry architecture that is now under threat. 
 
Industry architecture and the strategies used by businesses to create it is particularly evident in the 
computer industry, in part because of the rapid pace of technological development and the clear 
impact of technological discontinuities on both product architecture and industry structure (for 
example, the introduction of smartphones). On a longer timescale, other industries undergo similar 
transformations. The shift in the garment industry from producer-owned brands to retailer and 
fashion-business brands described by Gereffi would be a case in point. As Duguid (2003) has 
                                                          
17  The extensive literature on platforms and complements discusses how the broader platform ecosystem 
includes the platform and the complements that provide or increase functionality for users. Creators of 
complements are not suppliers in the traditional sense, as they are encouraged to innovate (within platform 
limits) and may not have a transactional relationship with the platform (see, for example, Gawer and Cusumano, 
2014; Hagiu and Wright, 2015). 
18 According to Wikipedia, an API is “a set of subroutine definitions, protocols, and tools for building application 
software.” Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_programming_interface. 
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demonstrated, the placement of particular activities along the value chain (in this case, the location of 
branding) is an outcome of intense competition between different actors in the chain and is not simply 
determined by “efficiency” or product characteristics. Rent capture is the key factor — both directly 
through ownership of the brand and indirectly through the impact of branding on sourcing options. In 
the cases of branding of alcohol products analysed by Duguid, multiple competing models of branding 
coexist.  
 
4 Conclusions 
The parsimonious theory of GVC governance put forward in GHS has been criticised for being both 
deterministic and failing to provide a convincing account of the role of suppliers in GVCs. One area 
where these potential deficiencies emerge with clarity is in accounts of lead firm power in GVCs. These 
appear to demote suppliers to the position of objects without agency whose fate is determined by the 
decisions made by powerful lead firms. It has been argued that this conception of how GVCs operate 
arises, in part, from the importance of offshoring and outsourcing of low-skilled work in late 20th 
century globalisation.  
 
This is now, at best, a very limited perspective. Empirically, globalisation has changed so rapidly in the 
first two decades of the 21st century that generalisations from the early stages of offshoring and 
outsourcing are poor guides to the dynamics of interfirm relationships in the current period. In 
particular, the rapid evolution of supplier capabilities in developing and emerging economies, 
combined with findings that show much more complexity and variability in supplier relations than GVC 
theorising has tended to recognise, makes a reconsideration of these issues urgent. While critiques of 
the approach set out in GHS have focused on the issues of determinism, functionalism and supplier 
agency (discussed further in Appendix 1), this paper has argued that a rethinking of the role of suppliers 
in GVCs can be supported by the incorporation of the capabilities approach and a recognition of the 
importance of dynamic capabilities in a more systematic way than that found in GHS.  
 
This has five benefits: 
 
• It provides resources for explaining observed heterogeneities in value chain structures across 
different countries and localities by emphasising the local and temporal aspects of capability 
acquisition.  
• It offers a way of addressing an issue — the outsourcing decision — that GVC governance 
theory marginalised from the outset. GHS starts from the existence of outsourcing and focuses 
on explaining why this can involve different governance forms. Use of the capability approach 
would provide a better understanding of the make-in/buy-out decision and offer insights into 
the dynamic processes that lead to changes in the division of labour along GVCs.  
• The capability approach also provides a basis for distinguishing between different types of 
suppliers and identifying those types of supplier activities that might favour the acquisition of 
capabilities that are valuable for their customers and hard for others to acquire. This then links 
the discussion of supplier agency to structural factors that constrain, but not necessarily 
exclude, their ability to take strategic actions.  
• The capability approach and arguments about industry architecture and architectural 
manipulation provide a link between lead firm agency and industrial structure, and this offers 
a way of exploring the issue of power inequalities in global value chains.  
• By picking up the concept of dynamic capabilities and applying it in the chain context, the 
argument points to the importance of seeing GVCs as dynamic, changing entities. This changes 
the discussion of governance from one of the efficient organisation of static relationships to 
the management of dynamic relationships and the role of suppliers in the overall 
competitiveness of GVCs.  
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The full implications of going down the capability route as a way of resolving the problems GVC theory 
has with suppliers have yet to be worked through, and this is the challenge that needs to be taken up.  
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Appendix 1: GVC governance theory: determinism and functionalism 
 
The discussion of suppliers, supplier agency and the broader context within which chains operate 
frequently leads to claims that GVC theory is deterministic and functionalist, as expressed clearly in 
the following quote:  
 
“In explaining the coordination of transactions between firms, GVC theory privileges these 
structural constraints rather than the intentional, strategic actions of firms…the ‘governance 
as coordination’ formulation reflects a key assumption of transaction cost economics, i.e. that 
the economy’s organizational forms emerge as efficient solutions to structural challenges of 
transacting, and particularly to problems associated with asset specificity.” (Gibbon et al., 
2008: 323) 
 
These claims are often derived from the theory’s use of the chain concept, its incorporation of 
transaction cost economics, the development of a parsimonious theory based on three determinants, 
and the emphasis placed on the role of lead firm power in the shaping operation of GVCs. 
 
A deterministic and functionalist interpretation of GVC theory can be elaborated along the following 
lines: 
 
1. Consumer requirements in final markets are differentiated, and GVC theory is particularly 
concerned with trade in non-standard products that require more coordination than arm’s-
length market relationships can provide. Customising products to particular market 
requirements has implications for product characteristics, and hence design, production and 
delivery. 
2. Product characteristics determine transactional characteristics: asset specificity, degree of 
modularity, capability requirements etc. The three variables used to explain the five 
governance outcomes in GHS are determined exogenously by transactional characteristics. 
3. The five outcomes are efficient solutions to governance challenges within the context of a 
given set of transactional characteristics. 
4. Lead firms have the power to make decisions that shape value chains and allow them to decide 
which governance options to implement. 
5. Competition between firms (and chains) ensures that the most efficient outcome will be 
achieved. Businesses that fail to adopt the governance solution indicated by the transactional 
characteristics will not survive. March and Olsen (1984: 735) refer to this as the assumption of 
historical efficiency.  
6. The consequences for suppliers are that they cannot exercise agency and their only options 
are determined by the efficient outcomes implemented by lead firms. 
 
This appendix considers these arguments by examining four issues: the chain concept, determinism, 
functionalism and lead firms. 
 
A1. What is meant by a “chain”? 
 
The idea of a linked sequence or chain of activities contributing to the production of a product is central 
to GVC framework and its antecedents. This idea is not unique to GVC theory. Yi (2003: 53) refers to 
“a sequential, vertical trading chain stretching across many countries”. Feenstra (1998: 36) refers to 
activities outsourced by large corporations as “part of their larger ‘value chain,’ which include all the 
activities from the conception of a product to its final delivery”. A widely definition of a global value 
chain comes from Kaplinsky and Morris (2001: 4): “the full range of activities required to bring a 
product or service from conception, through the different phases of production (involving a 
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combination of physical transformation and the input of various producer services), delivery to final 
consumers, and final disposal after use.” 
 
Such definitions lead to the criticism that value chains in GVC theory are “simple linear chain 
formations” (Coe and Hess, 2005: 453, stress in original). But, Kaplinsky and Morris follow their 
definition immediately with the observation that real-world value chains are considerably more 
complex. Similarly, Gereffi’s characterisation of a global commodity chain as a sequence of value-
adding economic activities is followed by a diagram that shows different actors and multiple routes 
that products might take as they move between producers and consumers (Gereffi, 1994: 97-98).  
 
Chains may not be linear, but the conception of a chain of activities running from conception to 
disposal/recycling has two substantial problems. First, how is it possible to establish where a chain 
begins and ends? Does a chain that involves metal components “begin” at the point(s) where the metal 
ore is taken out of the ground, or is it necessary to go back further and analyse mining industry inputs— 
heavy vehicle production, power generation, explosives, shipping, etc.? Second, what is the relevant 
scope of the activities that contribute to the creation of a product and should be included in the value 
chain? Global commodity/value chain theories tend to focus on design, physical transformation and 
marketing, whereas Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977: 128) include the reproduction of labour as part of 
the commodity chain.  
 
In fact, “chain” is better seen as a metaphor for connectedness and interdependence, as suggested by 
Sturgeon et al. (2008: 302). GVC governance theory is about different types of interdependence and 
how to manage them, and chain linkages only become interesting when interdependence has 
consequences.19  So, what is interdependence? The literature distinguishes between two types of 
interdependence — “sensitivity interdependence” and “vulnerability interdependence” (Baldwin, 
1980: 476-77). In the context of interfirm relationships sensitivity interdependence means that one 
firm is affected by the actions of another. If Firm A reduces its prices, another firm, Firm B, is affected 
in some way (it might lose market share if it is a competitor, or find its costs are reduced if it is a 
customer). Vulnerability interdependence implies a stronger relationship. Baldwin defines this as a 
situation where there are “benefits that would be costly for one or both parties to forego” (Baldwin, 
1980: 481). In other words, one firm’s actions could have potentially serious consequences for another. 
The seriousness of these consequences would lie on a continuum from ‘not very’ to ‘extremely’. The 
second definition is how interdependence has been mostly used in GVC governance theory, although 
recent analysis of power in GVCs has emphasised that indirect exercises of power through standards 
or norms can also have substantial consequences for other businesses (Dallas et al., 2019). 
 
Following this line of argument, a chain of transactions is a heuristic device whose usefulness depends 
upon the extent to which identifying transactional linkages allows key interdependencies to be located. 
The heuristic is certainly been useful for GVC theory is, as it drew attention to transnational production 
interdependencies not related to ownership. However, transactional linkages are neither necessary 
nor sufficient to create interdependence. They are not sufficient because commodities can flow 
between businesses without creating interdependence, as is the case with arm’s-length market 
transactions for standardised commodities. GVC theory focuses on the intermediate forms of 
governance, where interdependencies are more complex. Transactional linkages are not necessary for 
                                                          
19 This has two consequences. First, if a chain used standardised inputs to produce standardised outputs, both 
of which might be produced by many firms, governance issues would be uninteresting because switching costs 
would be so low as to eliminate most (if not all) interdependence. Second, the relevant parts of a chain for GVC 
analysis might change according to the nature of the problem being analysed. The construction and analysis of a 
"chain" to analyse the spread of foot-and-mouth disease in sheep might focus on livestock transport and markets, 
while a concern with quality and branding might focus on production and marketing. Any analysis of a chain has 
to be selective in order to be manageable, and selection depends on the issue to be explained.  
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interdependence because it can arise in their absence. The analysis of market and technology 
platforms shows that actors within a product ecosystem can have a substantial impact on other actors 
without having a direct transactional relationship. When Atari opened up its games platform to game 
developers, it managed it in a way that left it “unable to prevent entry of opportunistic developers, 
who flooded the market with poor-quality games” (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009: 163). This had serious 
consequences for Atari. 
 
The second problem with the chain heuristic is its focus on products and material flows. Rosenberg 
(1963: 422) rejected the Marshallian idea that an industry is constituted by “a collection of firms 
producing a homogeneous product — or at least products involving some sufficiently high cross-
elasticity of demand”. While accepting that this is useful for many analytical purposes, he argues that 
it hinders the analysis of technological development in the 19th century, when the same capital goods 
and technologies were used across multiple industries. The same reservation applies to products that 
may be used in a variety of sectors. For example, South African leather is used to make both shoes and 
car seats. As a result, automotive trade policy (which at one time led to a rapid increase in exports of 
another car seats) had a significant impact on the shoe industry, but the chain metaphor would not 
have drawn attention to this. The same kind of considerations apply to agriculture, whose outputs are 
incorporated into a wide range of industries, including food, construction, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, 
etc. Like all heuristics, the chain concept has advantages and disadvantages. Choosing an alternative 
concept such as network or ecosystem might create different advantages and disadvantages. 
 
A2. Determinism. 
 
The claim that GVC theory is deterministic and allows no space for agency rests largely on the claim 
that the three determinants of GVC governance forms — information complexity, codification and 
supplier competence — are exogenous variables. Complexity and codification would, in this view, be 
determined by the nature of the products and services transacted, and supplier competence also seen 
as exogenous to the transactions conducted. These “determinants” can, however, be viewed as the 
result of firm strategies, particularly those of lead firms.  
 
Complexity of information. The complexity of information required to sustain a transaction is the 
result of the decision about the product characteristics that are required. GHS introduces this concept 
with a direct reference to strategy, arguing that “Lead firms increase complexity when they place new 
demands on the value chain, such as when they seek just-in-time supply and when they increase 
product differentiation” (Gereffi et al., 2005: 84). Governance consequences arise from these decisions. 
In the case just mentioned, the introduction of just-in-time supply would place new demands on 
suppliers (at the very least, stockholding closer to the customer) and increase the vulnerability of both 
parties, but this is not determined by the nature of the product. Taking a different case, the decision 
by a company to seek assurances about suppliers’ labour standards would require changes by the 
suppliers, but this can be introduced in several different ways — through direct supervision, through 
company created and administered standards and through the adoption of independent standards 
regimes. The governance consequences of each would differ. GVC theory provides an account of the 
consequences of taking decisions targeting market segments and adjusting product design and 
production to meet the needs of these segments, but it does not define a one-to-one relationship 
between products and governance. 
 
Codification. Codification is an important determinant of governance for GHS. Drawing on the work of 
Sturgeon (2002) and others, GHS emphasises the role of codification in reducing the costs of 
information transfer and the complexity of coordination. Technical standards provide, in the words of 
Sanchez and Mahoney (1996: 64), “embedded coordination that greatly reduces the need for overt 
exercise of managerial authority to achieve coordination of development processes.” Process 
standards (such as labour and environmental standards managed through standard schemes) also 
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reduce and outsource the costs of oversight. However, standards can be created and adopted in a 
variety of ways, and the processes frequently involves a competition and cooperation between firms, 
groups of firms, standards-making organisations and states (David and Greenstein, 1990). GHS has 
been criticised explicitly for focusing on the positive collective aspects of technological standards and 
ignoring competition (Wen and Yang, 2010: 2114), but GVC studies have recognised explicitly the 
issues of power and competition in standard-setting (Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2011; Ponte et al., 2011). 
 
Supplier competence. The prior discussion has already examined the reasons why GVC theorising and 
empirical research have tended to focus on the incorporation of latecomer firms into the global 
economy as suppliers, with the resulting emphasis on their (in)ability to meet the demands of global 
customers. The explanatory variable is not the level of supplier capabilities as such, but rather the 
relationship between the capabilities needed to complete a transaction successfully and the level of 
supplier capabilities. The latecomer firm argument provides a general explanation of why, in the 
context of the incorporation of new productive regions into the global economy, there might be an 
issue with supplier competence.20 Lead firms can affect relative supplier competence through their 
decisions about what to outsource, through the selection of suppliers and locations, and through the 
extent to which they provide support for suppliers. These are influenced by factors such as costs in 
different locations and judgements about how to manage supplier performance risk.  
 
A3. Functionalism 
 
The critique of GVC governance theory as functionalist argues that it explains efficient governance 
choices as an outcome of the three transactional variables and assumes that efficient outcomes will 
be realised without providing an explanation of the processes that lead to it, or indeed the factors that 
might prevent efficient outcomes being achieved. Efficiency explanations are common in theories of 
industrial organisation. Transaction cost economics costs explains governance choices in terms key 
transactional characteristics that identify a most efficient solution: uncertainty, frequency of exchange, 
and the “degree to which durable transaction-specific investments are incurred” (Williamson, 1979: 
239). Later in the same article, Williamson goes on to state that: “The main hypothesis out of which 
transaction cost economics works is this: align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with 
governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, 
transaction cost economising) way.” (Williamson, 1991: 79). Similarly, the knowledge-based 
perspective of the enterprise sees interfirm relationships as seeking the minimisation of information 
costs (Hoetker, 2006: 502).  
 
As Foss points out, this line of reasoning fails to explain how agents learn to produce maximising 
decisions, how institutions change and which agents are responsible for the changes (Foss, 1994: 10). 
Instead, there is a resort to general arguments relating to competitiveness as the force ensuring 
efficient outcomes are proposed (businesses that adopt non-efficient solutions fail to survive). This 
approach is “inclined to see history as an efficient mechanism for reaching uniquely appropriate 
equilibria, less concerned with the possibilities for maladaptation and non-uniqueness in historical 
development” (March and Olsen, 1984: 735). The challenge for theories of the firm and theories of 
globalisation (including but not limited to GVC theory) is not to provide an argument in favour of 
indeterminacy — that things are more complicated and less predictable than parsimonious theories 
would imply — but rather to provide an account of evolution of the global economy that explains 
recent changes in capabilities, institutions and agents. Much of the empirical work in the field of GVCs 
and GPNs has paid attention to these questions. The task is now to incorporate this into theory. 
                                                          
20 Other GVC theorising, particularly in relation to upgrading, does put forward arguments about whether lead 
firms would promote or hinder the acquisition of capabilities by suppliers and distinguishes between different 
types of upgrading in the capabilities related to them (Giuliani et al., 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Pipkin 
and Fuentes, 2017). 
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A4 Lead Firms 
A final question that requires further attention is what is meant by “lead firm” in GVC theory. This term 
is used extensively across large parts of the GVC literature, with similar or identical terms being used 
in other approaches to firm linkages in the global economy (see note 2). Despite the centrality of the 
concept, its definition is not always clear. GHS refers to “lead firm” 27 times without providing a 
definition. In practice, the GVC literature tends to define lead firms by describing what they do: 
 
• Choosing the characteristics of the output of the chain (i.e., selecting the characteristics of the 
product and hence the target market — typically, in situations where product differentiation 
is an element of competitive strategy).  
• Inclusion/exclusion — supplier choice. In addition to this, there are further strategic decisions 
relate to sourcing strategies: the number of suppliers, which countries to source from, etc. 
• Distribution of activities. This is sometimes referred to as bundling and splitting. Which 
activities are bundled together within the single enterprise, or at a single location?  
• Monitoring performance. As the performance of actors in the supply chain has nontrivial 
consequences for supermarkets, controls over performance are required.21 
 
A second approach is to emphasise the role of the lead firm in making the decision to place a product 
on the market and initiate a production process: “Lead firms, at the very least, set product strategy, 
place orders, and take financial responsibility for the goods and services that their supply chains churn 
out” (Sturgeon, 2009: 129). In an earlier article Sturgeon (2001: 11) states that lead firms are “firms 
that initiate the flow of resources and information through the value chain by developing and 
marketing final products.”22 It is not clear how much this differs from the “shaping” definition. Does 
any firm that initiating production count as a “lead firm”? If such a firm relied totally on readily-
available parts and components and made a product similar to that of many other businesses, would 
it still be a “lead firm”? Or do phrases such as “set product strategies" and “developing and marketing 
final products” in the quotes above imply more than this?  
 
A third approach would make an explicit connection between lead firms and power. The two previous 
conceptions of lead firm were developed at a time when power in GVCs was viewed almost entirely as 
“exercised by well-defined actors with the resources to engage in intentional action to achieve clearly 
defined outcomes” (Dallas et al., 2019: 671). Dallas et al. see direct and dyadic power relations as one, 
but only one, form of exercising power and argue effectively in favour of complementing this “coercive” 
power with agenda setting power, preference shaping and the social construction of routines and 
practices. If lead firms are seen as those that exercise power in one or more of these ways, then lead 
firms could include those which define product architecture or standards, or play a role in establishing 
industry-wide norms that constrain or enlarge the options open to other firms. One implication of this 
is that platform leaders also included in the category of lead firm. Another is that instead of expecting 
to find a single lead firm in a value chain, there might be a constellation of firms with different levels 
of power that may be exercised across different choice areas.  
 
                                                          
21 It is worth noting that this list fails to include reference to the specific capabilities of lead firms and how they 
are required. By focusing on outsourcing and its management, GVC theory tends to leave the internal operations 
of the lead firm as a black box. 
22 Cited by Kawakami (2011: 19). 
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